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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of anomaly detection in
high-dimensional network streams. We have developed a new
technique, called Stream Projected Ouliter deTector (SPOT), to
deal with the problem of anomaly detection from high-dimensional
data streams. We conduct a case study of SPOT in this paper by
deploying it on 1999 KDD Intrusion Detection application. Inno-
vative approaches for training data generation, anomaly classifi-
cation and false positive reduction are proposed in this paper as
well. Experimental results demonstrate that SPOT is effective in
detecting anomalies from network data streams and outperforms
existing anomaly detection methods.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have witnessed a tremendous re-
search interest sparked by the explosion of data collected
and transferred in the format of streams over the network.
An intrusion into a computer network can compromise the
stability and security of the network leading to possible loss
of privacy, information and revenue [8]. In many cases,
network data streams can be modeled as high-dimensional
vectors where each of them contains a number of varied fea-
tures to measure the quantitative behaviors of the network
traffic, as in the 1999 KDD Intrusion Detection applica-
tion. For high-dimensional data, we notice that most, if not
all, anomalies existing in high-dimensional data streams are
embedded in some lower-dimensional subspaces (spaces
consisting of a subset of attributes). These anomalies are
termed projected anomalies in the high-dimensional space.
Most of the conventional outlier detection techniques
that are capable of detecting anomalies are only applica-
ble to relatively low dimensional data sets [2][5]. For those
methods in projected outlier detection in high-dimensional
space [9][7][6], their measurements used for evaluating
points’ outlier-ness are not incrementally updatable and
many of the methods involve multiple scans of data, mak-
ing them incapable of handling fast data streams. The tech-
niques for tackling outlier detection in data streams [1] rely
on full data space to detect outliers and thus projected out-
liers cannot be discovered by these techniques.
To detect anomalies from high-dimensional data
streams, we have developed a new technique, called Stream
Projected Outlier deTector (SPOT). SPOT uses multiple cri-
teria, called Projected Cell Summaries (PCS), to measure
the outlier-ness of data and draws on Multi-objective Ge-
netic Algorithm (MOGA) to search for the subspaces where
the projected anomalies exist. As the major contributions of
this paper, we have tackled several important issues, includ-
ing training data generation, anomaly categorization and
false positive reduction, in an effort to successfully apply
SPOT in 1999 KDD intrusion detection application.
2 Overview of SPOT
SPOT can be divided into two stages: learning and de-
tection stages. In learning stage, Sparse Subspace Tem-
plate (SST) is constructed by supervised and/or unsuper-
vised learning process. SST casts light on where projected
anomalies are likely to be found in the high-dimensional
space. Based upon SST, SPOT screens projected anomalies
from constantly arriving data in the detection stage.
In SPOT, SST consists of the following three subspace
subsets, Fixed SST Subspaces (FS), Clustering-based SST
Subspaces (CS) and Outlier-driven SST Subspaces (OS),
respectively. Fixed SST Subspaces (FS) contains all the
subspaces in the full lattice whose maximum dimension
is MaxDimention, where MaxDimention is a user-
specified parameter. Clustering-based SST Subspaces (CS)
consists of the sparse subspaces of the top training data that
have the highest overall outlying degree. The selected train-
ing data are more likely to be considered as anomalies that
can be potentially used to detect more subsequent anoma-
lies in the stream. The overall outlying degree of training
data is computed by employing clustering method. The av-
erage size of clusters a point belongs to provides an useful
insight into its accurate outlying degree. The sparse sub-
spaces of the top training data, obtained by MOGA, will
become CS of SST. In some cases, a few anomaly exam-
ples may be provided by domain experts. MOGA is applied
on each of these outliers to find their top sparse subspaces.
There subspaces are called Outlier-driven SST Subspaces
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I. INTRODUCTION
CTIVISM often refers to vigorous or intentional actions 
that aim to bring about social or political change [1]. The 
rapid development of the Internet makes it an ideal source for 
information and propaganda dissemination [2] [3]. Cyber 
activists use web sites, forums, and other types f computer 
media to bu ld relationships with the public, v ice their 
opinions, and spread their propaganda [4] [5]. Consequently, 
Cyberactivism, which refers to activism on the Internet, has 
emerged as a new and important social phenomenon. 
A comprehensive and systematic framework for analysis of 
Cyberactivism needs to be developed for researchers, analysts, 
and related government agents to get a better understanding of 
cyber activists and their online communities. For example, it 
has been observed that web sites of r lated activism gro ps are 
linked o each oth r through hyperlinks, creating their own 
co munity n twork [6]. A good research framework would 
include an effective method to identify such networks and the 
roles of the web sites in the networks. In forums, social 
networks of forum users, representative topics and phrases, and 
active users are useful information that can help understand 
member interactions. 
This paper presents a case study of online Free Tibet 
activities and is an initial attempt toward a framework to 
analyze Cyberactivism. Two popular Internet media, web sites 
and forums of Free Tibet activities, are identified, collected, 
and analyzed. We aim to shed light on the following research 
questions:
1. What automated methods can be used to analyze 
Cyberactivism? 
2. What knowledge and insights can we gain through 
social network and topical analysis of Cyberactivis ? 
II. FREE TIBET
Tibet generally refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region, a 
province-level entity governed by the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). Religion is extremely important to the Tibetans 
and Tibet is the traditional center of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Panchen Lamas and Dalai Lamas are two well-known spiritual 
leaders of Tibetans.
Tibet was first included into China’s territory in the 1300s. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Tibet and Mongolia 
signed a treaty proclaiming mutual recognition and their 
independence from the Republic of China.  When the China 
Civil War ended in 1949, Tibet became a part of the PRC. In 
1959, PRC armies thwarted the Tibetan resistance movement 
and Tenzin Gyats , the 14th D lai Lama, fled to India. 
The C ntral T b tan Administrat on (CTA), also referred to 
a  the Tibetan G vernment in Exil  (TGE), is headed by the 
14th Dalai Lama and claims to be the rightful and legitimate 
government of Tibet.  Free Tibet activities refer to activities 
that aim to support the independence of Tibet. Most Free Tibet 
activities are guided by the CTA. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Free Tibet relat d web sites and forums are the focuses of 
this case study. Such web sites and forums are created and 
maintained by activists, supporters, and sympathizers in a 
variety of languages, including English, Chinese, and Tibetan. 
In this study, we propose different methodologies for analysis 
of each medium. 
A. Web Site Analysis 
1) Identifying and Collecting Important Web Sites 
Since there are many Free Tibet web sites available, the first 
step is to identify which ones are important. Fig. 1 shows our 
identification process. 
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(OS). Based on OS, we can effectively detect more anoma-
lies that are similar to these anomaly examples.
The detection stage performs anomaly detection for in-
coming stream data using SST. As streaming data arrive
continuously, the data synapses. i.e. PCS, are first updated
dynamically in order to capture new information of arrived
data. Then, we retrieve PCS of each subspace in SST to
see whether or not this data is a projected anomaly. These
steps can be performed very fast so that the time criticality
requirement posed by the data streams can be met.
3 Network Anomaly Detection using SPOT
Our case study is anomaly detection from 1999 KDD in-
trusion detection data stream. This data stream contains a
wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network
environment. Each instance in this data set is a vector of
extracted feature values from a connection record obtained
from the raw network data gathered during the simulated
intrusions. Each connection was labeled as either normal
or as exactly one specific kind of attacks. The simulated
attacks fall into one of the following four categories: DoS,
R2L, U2R and Probing. A training data set is available in
data set for model building purpose. The goal of this appli-
cation is to category a large number of unlabeled network
connections into the above-mentioned four classes.
In this case study, we need to address several important
issues in order to successfully deploy SPOT. These issues
include generation of new training data sets, incorporation
of anomaly categorization function into SPOT and devel-
opment of new mechanism to noticeably reduce false posi-
tives.
3.1 Training Data Generation
The training data set available in this case study cannot
be directly used by SPOT and other anomaly-based detec-
tors. This is due to the high proportion of attacks instances
in this training data set; as high as 91% of the samples in this
training data are attacks. Normal data behavior is needed in
quantitizaton of fitness function of MOGA in the first step
of SPOT outlined above.
In this case study, we adopt a multiple-sample genera-
tion strategy to meet the learning needs of SPOT. The basic
idea is that, for each intrusion class, multiple training sam-
ples are generated and MOGA is applied on each of these
samples to produce OS for each class. Mathematically, let
DT be the original training data set available. DT consists
two parts, the normal and intrusion samples, denoted byDN
and DI , respectively, where DI consists intrusion samples
of the four different classes, i.e. DI = ∪4i=1DiI . In our
work, we generate multiple new training samples with re-
placement from DiI for i ∈ [1, 4], each such new sample
can be expressed asDi,jT � = DN ∪D
i,j
I , where j is the num-
ber of samples generated fromDiI . By applying MOGA on
Di,jT � , we can obtain OS for class i ∈ [1, 4], denoted as OSi,
as OSi = ∪jMOGA(Di,jT � ). The complete OS is simply
the union of OSi for i ∈ [1, 4].
3.2 Intrusion Classification
Intrusion classification mainly involves the categoriza-
tion of detected anomalies into one of the known intrusion
classes or the class of false positive. To do this, we need to
construct the signature subspaces for each intrusion classes.
The signature subspaces for a target class are those sub-
spaces that can be used to identify intrusions for this par-
ticular class. To construct the signature subspaces for a
particular class, we collect the outlying subspaces of those
anomalies belonging to this class.
Within a class, different signature subspaces have vary-
ing weights as to correctly identify anomalies for this class.
The weight of a signature subspace s with respect to c rep-
resent the discriminating ability of s towards c. In our work,
we borrow the idea of tf-idf (term frequency-inverse docu-
ment frequency) weighting method, a commonly used tech-
nique in the domain of information retrieval and text min-
ing, to measure the weight of signature subspaces for each
class.
Similarity measure needs to be properly defined before
the anomalies can be classified. The similarity between an
anomaly o and class c is defined as their average inner prod-
uct, i.e. Sim(o, c) = o·c|OS(o)| , where |OS(o)| denotes the
number of outlying subspaces of o.
3.3 Handle False Positives
False positives are those anomalies that are erroneously
detected as the attacks by the system. They consume a fair
amount of human efforts and consequently makes it almost
impossible for security officers to really concentrate only on
the real attacks. It is much desirable to quickly screen out
these false-positives in order to allow closer attention to be
paid towards the real harmful attacks.
In this case study, there are no available false-positive
exemplars in the training data set. Therefore, unlike the
attack classes, it is not easy to directly create the signature
subspaces for the false-positive class. However, there are
a large amount of normal data in the training data set. If
any of them are found abnormal, i.e. having some outlying
subspaces, then they will be considered as false positives.
The outlying subspaces of these false positives will be used
to construct the signature subspaces for false-positive class.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We conduct experimental evaluation on SPOT in 1999
KDD Intrusion Detection application. Comparative study
is also performed to investigate the detection accuracy
and false positive rate between SPOT and other existing
anomaly detection methods. The methods we would like to
compare with SPOT in this case study include the anomaly
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Figure 1. ROC curves of different
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Figure 2. Effect of number of samples
for each anomaly class
detection method proposed in [4] and [3]. The first method
defines the outlier-ness of a data point using the distance
between it and its kth neighborhood (called local neigh-
borhood method) [4]. The second method uses clustering
method to identify those data that are far from the dense
regions of the data points as anomalies (called global clus-
tering method) [3].
ROC Analysis. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
analysis is a commonly used technique for performance
evaluation of detection methods by plotting its True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) in the same ROC
space. True Positive Rate refers to the percentage of hits
(correctly identified anomalies) in the whole set of anoma-
lies existing in the data set and False Positive Rate repre-
sents the percentage of erroneously labeled anomalies in the
whole set of normal data. Since these two metrics are con-
flicting to achieve, we thus need to consider these two rates
simultaneously. In Figure 1, we plot the ROC curves for
SPOT and the two competitive methods. We can see from
this figure that the ROC curve of SPOT progresses much
closer to the upper-left coner of the plot than the curves
of the other two methods, indicating that SPOT achieves
a much better detection performance. SPOT performs sub-
space exploration in anomaly detection, thus it has a better
anomaly detection ability that leads to better detection ac-
curacy. In addition, the false positive classification enable
SPOT to identify false positives in an automated fashion
while the competitive methods cannot.
Signature Subspace Analysis. We are also interested
in studying the diversity of signature subspaces of false-
positives, as compared with those of the attack classes. We
record the number of unique strong signature subspaces for
anomalies in different classes (including the false-positive
class) as the number of data we evaluated increases. We
plot the results in Figure 2. It is clear that the number of
unique signature subspaces for the false-positive class is
significantly higher than any other attack class by a factor
of three or four. This means that the signature subspaces for
the false-positive is far more diverse that those of the attack
classes. This finding offers an important guidance to us in
creating the set of signature subspaces of the false-positive
class. We need to collect a relatively large pool of signature
subspaces in the detection process for achieving accurate
detection of false-positives.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate anomaly detection problem
in high-dimensional data streams. We carry out a case study
using 1999 KDD Intrusion Detection data set. As the ma-
jor contributions, several important issues, including train-
ing data generation, anomaly categorization using outlying
subspaces analysis and false positive reduction, have been
successfully tackled in this paper for rendering SPOT appli-
cable in this study. The experimental evaluations show that
SPOT is not only more effective in detecting anomalies but
also produces a significantly lower level of false positives
than the existing anomaly detection methods.
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